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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade an increase in labour taxation reforms have been observed across 
several countries. The main target of these reforms has generally been to encourage labour 
supply among different groups. In the case of Sweden, an earned income tax credit was 
introduced in 2007 and reinforced in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 as a measure to deal with 
the high unemployment level. The relationship between labour taxation and the 
employment level might thus suffer from bias due to reverse causality. 
This paper examines the relationship between the income taxation rate and the employment 
level in Sweden, using panel data of Sweden’s municipalities over the time period 1993-
2013. To overcome the endogeneity problems, an Instrumental Variable model has been 
used where the averaged neighbouring municipalities’ tax rates act as an instrument.  The 
results suggest that the income taxation rate has a negative effect on the employment level, 
where the Instrumental Variable model presents an almost twice as high effect in 
comparison to the OLS results.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
KEY WORDS: Labour taxation, employment level, Swedish municipalities, Instrumental Variable, panel 
data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 .  INTRODUCTION                                                                                                            3-4  
2. LABOUR TAXATION AND ENDOGENEITY                       5-8  
2.1 TAX WEDGES AND INCOME TAXATION                                                                                                                                             5-7 
2.2 THE SWEDISH EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT                                                                                                                                  7 
2.3 ENDOGENEITY OF TAXATION                                                                                                                                                                        8 
3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH                                             9-11  
4. ECONOMETRICAL METHOD                     12-15  
 
4.1 METHOD                                                                                                                                                                                                    12 
4.2 SELECTING AN INSTRUMENT                                                                                                                                                             12-13 
4.2 FIXED EFFECTS OLS MODEL                                                                                                                                                                         14 
4.2 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES MODEL                                                                                                                                            14-15 
 
5. DATA                                                                                        16-17 
5.1 SAMPLE AND DATA                        16-17 
6. RESULTS                       18-24  
6.1 OLS MODEL  18-19 
6.2 FIRST STAGE RESULTS  20 
6.3 SECOND STAGE RESULTS  21-22 
6.4 ROBUSTNESS  22-24 
7. DISCUSSION                      25-27  
7.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION 25-26 
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 26-27 
7.3 TIME-LINE CONSIDERATIONS        27 
7.4 SAMPLE SIZE AND VARIABLES                                                                                                                                                                  27 
8. CONCLUSION                                                                  28  
9. FUTURE RESEARCH                                                               29-30  
9.1 SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS FOR SIMILAR STUDIES                   29 
9.2 OTHER AREAS OF STUDY                   29-30 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                                          31-34  
 
 
 
 
 
3
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rising unemployment levels in countries around the world have enforced discussions 
regarding labour taxation and the role that policies play to curb these rising levels. Labour 
taxation has not only been a central subject for economic researchers but also a 
controversial topic for political parties.  Estimating the relationship between labour 
taxation and employment has been on the agenda for several decades (Pencavel, 1986; 
Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999). 
By creating a wedge between the employer’s labour cost and the equivalent net pay for 
the worker, the taxation on labour reduces the amount of labour supplied.  
In the past decade several OECD countries have been confronted with these rising 
unemployment levels and have been forced to implement different policies in order to 
battle higher unemployment levels. One method that has been frequently turned to is the 
implementation of an income tax credit.  
Examples of this include the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US which first was 
enacted in 1975 and further expanded in 1986, 1990, 1993, 2001 and 2009 (Hamad & 
Rehkopf, 2015). In addition to the EITC in the US, several other countries have enforced 
a similar tax credit, for instance the Working Tax Credit in the UK (Azmat, 2014), 
Jobbskatteavdraget in Sweden (Regeringens proposition (2006/07:1) and the Working 
Income Tax Benefit in Canada (Government of Canada, 2015) to name a few.  
These countries are clear examples of policy makers adjusting taxation policies on the 
basis of the prevalent employment situation. As the taxation policies are assumed to 
response to the employment level in the country, there is a risk of reverse causality 
occurring, which would result in biased estimates if not accounted for.   
It is of upmost importance to fully understand the relationship between the labour 
taxation and the labour market and in particular the effect that it has on the employment 
level. By enhancing the understanding of this relationship, tools can be created for policy 
makers to improve the effects of policies targeting these certain groups.  
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the income 
taxation rate and the employment level in Sweden.  By the means of a panel data set of 
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the Swedish municipalities, this relationship will be estimated using the municipality tax 
rate, meaning that it is the change in the proportional tax that will be studied. This 
estimation will be completed using a fixed effects OLS model as well as an Instrumental 
Variable model. To instrument for the municipality tax, an averaged sum of all the 
neighbouring municipalities’ tax rates will be used. 
This study contributes to the existing research that has turned to the use of panel data to 
shed light on the patters of employment within Sweden. A great deal of focus within the 
previous literature has been put on the effects that macroeconomic shocks and labour 
market institutions have on the employment level. In opposition, this thesis builds on the 
studies that focus on the effects of fiscal policy. Nonetheless, the largest contribution of 
this present study is towards the research area of endogeneity within taxation. Bearing in 
mind that this is a fairly un-researched area, the hopes of developing a method towards a 
better handling of endogeneity is great.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the theory behind 
labour taxation and its effect on employment. The subsequent Section 3 offers an 
overview of the existing literature and empirical studies within the field. The 
methodology used in this paper is thereafter outlined in Section 4 followed by a 
description of the data set in Section 5. The empirical results are presented and discussed 
in Section 6 and Section 7 followed by concluding remarks and suggestions for future 
studies in Section 8 and Section 9.  
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2. LABOUR TAXATION AND ENDOGENEITY 
2.1 TAX WEDGES AND INCOME TAXATION  
According to the OECD definition, a tax wedge is defined as: “the ratio between the 
amount of taxes paid by an average single worker (a single person at 100% of average 
earnings) without children and the corresponding total labour cost for the employer. The 
average tax wedge measures the extent to which tax on labour income discourages 
employment. This indicator is measured in percentage of labour costs.” (OECD, 2015). 
Thus the tax wedge includes the personal income tax. 
The question of labour taxation and to which extent it affects the employment level has 
as previously mentioned been a widely discussed topic and as can be seen from the 
definition of OECD, tax wedges can be viewed as discouraging employment. The 
negative correlation is thought to emerge as labour taxation reduces the supply of labour 
which as a result leads to an increase in the unemployment level (Vodopivec, 2005). In 
the recent decade, several OECD countries have begun a reduction in tax wedges with 
the purpose of improving the unemployment level as well as encouraging job creation 
(OECD, 2006).  
The taxation of labour is not solely affecting the supply side of the labour market but also 
the demand side. The demand for labour decreases if the tax results in an increase in 
labour costs. There are two main causes for this, either if the levied tax falls on the 
employers and there is no possibility of passing it onto the employed workers, or if the 
levied tax falls on the employed workers and they have the opportunity of passing it onto 
their employers in order to keep their real consumption wage (Rutkowski & Walewski, 
2007).  
Accordingly, the supply of labour decreases if the levied tax falling on the workers results 
in a lower real consumption wage, as the workers are incapable of counteracting it with 
proportionately higher wages. In addition, a reduction in labour supply is also expected if 
the levied tax falls on the employers and they successfully pass it onto the employees 
through lower wages. Altogether, adding the outcomes of the decrease in labour demand 
together with the decrease in labour supply the finishing result is a lower employment 
level.  
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Labour taxation and its effect on employment is determined by two essential factors, 
namely the labour market institutions and the individual’s preferences, that is, the 
dominant effect of the income- and substitution effects.  In a case of high unemployment 
and limited work opportunities, the negotiating power of employers becomes higher than 
usual as well as weaker than usual for employees. This state causes the employees to bear 
the incidence of the tax. However, in the opposite case with several work vacancies being 
hard to fill, the negotiating power falls on the employees instead which naturally indicates 
that the incidence of the tax will be borne by the employers (Rutkowski & Walewski, 
2007). 
Additional factors that impact the negotiating power of the employers and the employees 
are the labour market institutions where the presence of for instance trade unions, fixed 
minimum wages and employment protection legislation raise the negotiating power of 
employees as well as their possibility of passing the tax incidence onto the employers. 
Labour costs generally increase as a consequence of labour market institutions, and the 
employment level pays the price for the maintenance of wages. Classically, a more elastic 
labor demand results in a smaller effect of a payroll tax on aggregate labour costs and on 
the other hand a larger effect on wages and employment. Moreover, a more elastic labour 
supply produces a larger impact on employment and less on wages (Rutkowski & 
Walewski, 2007). 
(Rutkowski & Walewski, 2007) sum up the implications as follows: 
Increasing labour taxation can as a temporary disequilibrium cause growth in 
unemployment up to the point when wages adjust to the decreased demand. On the 
contrary, a permanent decrease in employment will be produced provided that the 
negative labour demand is not compensated by an equal positive demand shift, for 
instance by greater labour productivity and hence a decrease in unit labour cost.  
In the short run, provided that the demand and supply of labour is subject to inelasticity, 
an increase in the labour taxation schedule is expected to have a restricted effect on 
employment. A greater part of the effect is expected to fall on the wages, and if the 
incidence falls on the workers or employers is contingent on the elasticity of labor 
demand and labour supply. However, in the long run a growing tax on labour will have a 
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larger negative effect on employment as firms discover means to substitute capital for 
more costly labour.  
The largest impact on employment followed by an increase in labour taxation will fall on 
groups for which the demand for labour is the most elastic. Included in these groups are 
low-skilled workers, young and older workers as well as women. This impact will be 
further intensified if the supply of labour in these groups has a high elasticity.  
In the instance of labour market regulations and strong trade unions which limit 
downward pressure on wage modification, the negative impact that payroll taxes have on 
employment will strengthen.  
A further aspect that needs to be taken into account is that a higher tax on labour 
increases the relative cost of formal employment in regards to informal and untaxed 
employment. Consequently, there is an expected decrease in formal employment in favor 
for an increased informal employment. This potential effect is of upmost importance to 
fiscal policy as an increase in informal employment would imply lower tax revenues.   
Last of all, an increase in the taxation of labour shifts consumption from the private 
sector to the public sector. An effect following this shift is of work opportunities, 
referring to the movement of private jobs to public. For that reason a common act by 
governments to encourage work incentives is to shift taxation of labour to consumption 
taxes (Pestel & Sommer, 2013). 
 
 
2.2 SWEDISH EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT  
In order to battle high unemployment levels and strengthen labour supply, modern tax 
policy has turned to the usage of in-work tax subsidies. The most prominent examples 
being the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US as well as the equivalent UK 
version  of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC). The Swedish counterpart, 
Jobbskatteavdraget, was set into action in 2007 with the intention of improving 
employment. With a purpose of offering enhanced incentives for individuals to move 
from unemployment to as a minimum, part-time work (Prop. 2006/07:1). These 
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enhanced work incentives were expected to be reached by the means of decreasing 
marginal tax rates on labour for low and middle-income earners.   
 
2.3 ENDOGENEITY OF TAXATION  
Endogeneity issues are caused when a variable in a regression is determined by other 
elements in the regression, indicating that there exists a correlation between either the 
covariate and the error term or the other variables. Reverse causality is one of the most 
typical causes of endogeneity (Kennedy, 2008). 
Within the research area of employment and taxation, the existing macro literature rarely 
discusses the potential endogeneity issues with the most common determining variables. 
The taxation schedules and the factors driving alterations within these are frequently 
associated with further changes in the economy and to identify a causal effect of taxation 
on employment one need an exogenous variation in the tax rate.  
As previously mentioned, the aim of the Swedish EITC was to boost employment, which 
accordingly is a shared aim for municipalities while altering tax rates. Taxation is often 
used as an instrument to tackle the incentives of individuals and hence acts as a steering 
wheel.  This is a great indicator of labour taxation being a candidate of suffering from 
reverse causality. Hence the OLS estimates run a risk of being affected by omitted 
variables bias and reverse causality. In accordance with this, the potential endogeneity 
needs to be adjusted for.  
A common method of handling endogeneity is by the means of an Instrumental Variables 
model. This model entails the discovery and use of an instrumental variable instead of the 
endogenous variable, and hence escapes the problems with reverse causality. This is the 
path that this paper will follow and the method will be discussed in more detail further 
ahead.  
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3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
To provide an overview of previous research within this field of study this section will 
present a number of studies made within the area. 
Studying the relationship between labour taxation and employment can be done in 
numerous ways, with the largest difference laying in the choice of variables. One popular 
method is by using the tax wedge as the chosen labour taxation variable. One of which is 
the study by (Dolenc & Laporsek, 2010) that examine the effect of the tax wedge on the 
employment growth in 27 EU member states. Using a panel data set stretching over the 
period 1999-2008 the authors find that the negative relationship between the tax wedge 
and employment was confirmed, where a one percentage point increase in the tax wedge 
reduces the employment growth by around 0.04 percentage points.  
Similarly, (Nickell, 2003) chooses to use the tax wedge to study its relationship to 
employment; however this study focuses on the effect that the tax wedge has on the 
incentives to work. This paper is also based on a selection of OECD countries. The 
author finds that a 10 per cent increase in the tax wedge is associated with a two per cent 
reduction in labour input. 
Contrary to the previously mentioned studies, (Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2012) finds that the 
income tax wedge for the years 1998-2010 does not have a significant effect on the 
employment rate in Macedonia. As this result is quite unanticipated the author argues that 
in this case the burden of the taxation might have fallen on the employees in the form of 
lower wages which discourages labour supply. 
Even though there are mixed results across countries, a majority of the studies appear to 
find a negative relationship between labour taxation and employment as theory predicts, 
see for example (Faria, 2004; Pissarides, 1998). 
In addition to these papers that explore the relationship between labour taxation and its 
effect on employment, a new supplement has been added within this field and departs 
from the theory of taxation being endogenous in the labour market framework. 
Endogeneity of taxation is still a rather unsearched area, though there are a couple of 
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studies that have proceeded from this theory of endogeneity and have chosen to 
overcome these issues by the means of an Instrumental Variables model.  
One paper in particular has inspired the writing of this current study and is by (Lehmann 
et al., 2013) and examines the unemployment-reducing effect of tax progressivity. The 
paper includes a panel of 21 OECD countries over the time range of 1998-2008. Despite 
that (Lehmann et al., 2013) mainly focus in presenting a larger progressive tax schedule 
and its raise on the employment rate, they nonetheless discuss and account for the 
potential endogeneity of taxation. The authors tackle the endogeneity issues by the means 
of an instrumental variables approach where the tax wedge and tax progressivity are 
instrumented with a sample of variables including: a measure of the political orientation 
of the parliament, an index of distrust in civil services as well as a narrative record for the 
tax components of fiscal consolidation policies. The authors interpret the variation 
between the OLS estimates and the IV estimates as a confirmation that reverse causality 
presents an attenuation bias.   
In similarity to the previous study, (Duncan & Peter, 2008) have identified the potential 
endogeneity within the taxation schedule. In contrast to the present study and other 
studies within the area of taxation and employment, (Duncan & Peter, 2008) examine the 
reverse causality between the progressivity of income taxation and income inequality. 
This study is based on a large panel of countries over the period of 1981-2005. 
Nonetheless, the authors choose to overcome the endogeneity problems with the use of 
an IV model. To instrument for the countries’ tax progressivity schedules the authors use 
the neighbouring countries’ distance-population weighted averages of tax progressivity 
measures. This paper has also worked as a building block for the present study regarding 
the choice of instrument and will be discussed in more detail further ahead. Hence, the 
method of which the authors have used in their paper is of more relevance to this study 
than their actual topic.  
The aim of this study is to not solely build on the existing research within the area of 
labour taxation and employment but perhaps first and foremost to add to the literature of 
endogeneity within taxation. By continuing the path of using an IV model to overcome 
endogeneity, the ambition is to further develop the selection of good instruments and to 
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enable an additional analysis of whether or not this trail ought to be followed in future 
studies.  
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4. ECONOMETRICAL METHOD 
4.1 METHOD 
To enable an empirical analysis on the effect of labour taxation on the employment level 
in Sweden, a panel covering 283 of Sweden’s 290 municipalities has been collected over a 
time range of 21 years. This kind of panel data requires a fixed effects estimator for 
various reasons. The most prominent reason being the need to control for the effects of 
time-invariant variables affecting the municipalities by using time-invariant effects, in 
addition to including time fixed effects. Hence, this unobserved heterogeneity can be 
controlled when it is constant over time and correlated with the independent variables 
(Williams, 2015).  
Furthermore, a panel of this sort is likely to suffer from certain problems concerning the 
standard errors. (Grassmueck, 2011) claims that the use of aggregate data can result in a 
state where the residuals do not satisfy the independence assumption. He argues that the 
residuals are expected to be positively correlated and therefore suggests the use of cluster-
correction of the standard errors to solve for this problem. Hence, the models used will 
have clustered standards errors. A log-linear approach is taken which will result in the 
following interpretation: a unit change in the tax-variable explaining a percentage change 
in the employment level. 
Two different methods will be used to estimate the causal relationship between labour 
taxation and the employment level. The first model used is a fixed effects OLS model 
with no modifications made to account for the potential endogeneity problems. The 
second model used is a fixed effects Instrumental Variables model, departing from the 
theory of taxation being endogenous to employment variables. Estimating both an OLS 
model and an IV model allows for a comparison to be made between the models, where 
a discussion of the potential size and direction of the bias is enabled. 
 
 
4.2 SELECTING AN INSTRUMENT 
The consistency of the instrumental variable model is immensely reliant on the 
instruments chosen for estimation and their validity. Hence, the selection of a proper 
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instrument is crucial and one of the most important parts of the analysis (Veerbeck, 
2012). 
In this framework there appears to be several potential candidates to instrument the tax 
rate. (Lehmann et al, 2013) instrument the tax wedge and tax progressivity by using a 
narrative record for the tax components of fiscal consolidation policies, a measure of the 
political orientation of the parliament and an index of distrust in civil services. As 
(Lehmann et al, 2013) have a panel set consisting of a range of OECD countries, some 
variables included in their study are clearly unsuitable for the present analysis. 
Nonetheless, a political variable indicating which wing a municipality belongs to could for 
a few reasons be considered a candidate to instrument the tax rates. However, due to data 
limitations and the possibility of municipalities forming party–transcendent agreements, 
this path was not followed. 
(Duncan & Peter, 2008) have likewise identified the endogeneity within tax schedules in 
an alternative context. This study proceeds from the theory of tax competition in which 
countries compete for the tax base. This is also the theory of which I will progress this 
study, by developing it to cover municipalities instead of countries and applying it to the 
present model. Here it is assumed that tax schedules in country X are correlated with tax 
schedules in the neighbouring country Y. The intuition behind this theory originates in 
the thought of countries competing for employees by the means of the tax schedule. 
Seeing as the employment level in country X is not expected to have an autonomous 
effect on the tax schedule in country Y, the instrument and the other elements of the 
regression can be assumed to be uncorrelated. 
Using this method, the neighbouring municipalities’ taxation rates act as instruments to 
enable an identification of the causal relationship between tax rates on the employment 
level. If the correlation between the taxation rates of neighbouring municipalities is high 
enough and the IV model thus has a strong first stage, it would indicate that it is a valid 
instrument to precede the analysis with (Bascle, 2008).  
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4.3 OLS MODEL 
The OLS model used in this study is presented as equation (1) below: 
Ln empit = αi + ϓt+ β1 taxit + β2 Xit + uit 
 
Ln empit is a logged employment variable, αi is the unobserved time-invariant individual 
effect, ϓt is the time fixed effect, the tax variable represents the labour tax of the various 
municipalities over time, Xit is a vector of control variables described in section 5 along 
with a further explanation of all the variables.  
 
 
4.4 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES MODEL 
To account for the endogeneity in the taxation variable, the use of the neighboring 
municipalities’ taxation schedules will act as instruments. In order to generate this 
instrumental variable, an average tax rate is calculated for each municipality based on the 
neighboring municipalities’ tax schedules.  
The instrumental variable estimation is made up of two equations, namely the first stage 
and the second stage. Estimating the first stage equation entails regressing the 
instrumental variable on the endogenous variable and the other control variables. This is 
done in order to demonstrate the relationship between these variables. For this method 
to be successful and offer consistent estimates, it is of upmost importance that there 
exists a strong first stage (Verbeek, 2012). In the context of this study, the average tax 
rate of the neighboring municipalities must have a strong impact on the endogenous 
variable, that is, the own municipalities tax rate. In the second stage, the employment 
level is regressed upon the first stage prediction of the labour taxation rate. 
The first stage equation is specified as equation (2) below: 
Taxit = αi + ϓt  + β1 avg_taxit + β2 Xit + uit    
 
(1) 
(2) 
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The second stage equation is specified as equation (3) below: 
Ln empit = αi + ϓt  + β1 Predicted taxit + β2 Xit + uit   
 
As the OLS model in this study is assumed to be biased due to reverse causality, it is of 
interest to discuss in which direction this bias might go. If the OLS model is not able to 
measure the full effect of labour taxation on the employment level due to endogeneity, 
then there would be a downward bias on the OLS estimates of β, implying that the OLS 
results are underestimated compared to the Instrumental Variable models results.  
However this bias might just as well go in the opposite direction due to other causes and 
measurement errors resulting in an upward bias and overestimated OLS estimates of β.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
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5. DATA 
5.1 SAMPLE AND DATA 
The panel used in this analysis has sampled yearly data ranging from 1993 to 2013, 
covering 283 of the 290 Swedish municipalities. Data for all the variables included in the 
panel have been collected from the database Statistics Sweden.  
Due to changes to the municipalities in year 1999, some alterations were made to the 
municipality codes as well as the formation of a new municipality. The municipality 
Knivsta was dropped from the sample as its existence has only been covering roughly 
half the time series. A number of municipalities consist of islands which hinder the 
formation of good instrumental variables in these cases; as a result these municipalities 
were also dropped from the sample.  
 
The employment level has been chosen as the dependent variable. This variable has been 
transformed in natural logarithms for the regression analysis as this variable is measured 
as the amount of employed in the various municipalities. Using a log-linear model is 
beneficial for several reasons. One of which is for the simplification of the interpretation, 
as a unit increase of X leads to a β per cent change in Y.  
To enable an analysis of the effect of labour taxation on the employment level in 
municipalities, the variable chosen to represent labour taxation must be chosen with care. 
As the tax schedules in the municipalities can be calculated in a couple of ways the most 
important question relates to the inclusion of the county tax. Consequently, in order to 
distinguish the effects of the municipalities, the selected tax schedule is solely made up 
from the municipality tax.  
Using the logarithm of employment generates a need of controlling for the labour force. 
As a proxy for the labour force level the total population between the ages 20 to 64, in 
each municipality has been added.  
Other factors that might have an effect on the tax schedule and thus on the employment 
level are the municipalities’ needs for various expenses such as childcare and old-age care. 
Hence, important variables to control for are the amount of young and old in the 
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municipalities respectively. The variable for the amount of young is the sum of 
inhabitants between 0-19 and 65- correspondingly for the old.  
An additional variable controlled for is the total municipality expenses. This variable is 
the sum of the following expenses: political activities, infrastructure, culture, recreational 
activities, preschool and school expenses, education, geriatric- and handicap care, 
individual- and family care, certain directed contributions and business expenses. This 
variable however is not available for the entire time series, so it will only be included in 
the sub sample regressions.  
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6. RESULTS 
6.1 OLS MODEL 
The estimation results from equation 1 are presented in Table 1 below. The entire time-
series as well as numerous sub-samples have been estimated and presented in order to 
enable a wider interpretation of the results. In addition the two left-most columns include 
the additional control variable of municipality costs.  
 
  
TABLE 1. OLS RESULTS 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Employment 
level 
1994-2013 
 
(a) 
2000-2013 
 
(b) 
2005-2013 
 
(c) 
2000-2013 
With expenses 
(d) 
2005-2013 
With expenses 
(e) 
Taxes 0.0044 
(5.54e-06) 
-0.0085122 
(0.00604) 
-0.0433558*** 
(0.0061863) 
-0.0011637 
(0.006354) 
-0.0321641*** 
(0.0064585) 
Young 1.98e-06 
(0.00001) 
0.000016* 
(8.30e-06) 
0.0000442*** 
(0.0000104) 
0.0000117 
(7.69e-06) 
0.0000286*** 
(9.83e-06) 
Old 0.0000241*** 
(5.64e-06) 
0.0000174*** 
(3.06e-06) 
0.0000122*** 
(3.47e-06) 
0.0000214*** 
(4.06e-06) 
0.0000257*** 
(4.89e-06) 
Work-age 5.54e-06** 
(2.31e-06) 
-3.70e-06 
(3.17e-06) 
-0.000016*** 
(4.51e-06) 
-2.29e-06 
(3.20e-06) 
-0.0000127*** 
(4.66e-06) 
Municipality 
expenses 
------- ------- ------- -4.82e-07 
(2.29e-07) 
-1.58e-06*** 
(2.61e-07) 
Adjusted R2 0.4791 0.5663 0.6624 0.5459 0.7350 
Coefficients are followed by standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
The estimates have time and individual fixed effects.  
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The results for the complete time-series suggest that the labour taxation rate has no 
significant impact on the employment level. As for the control variables the amount of 
old residents along with the working-age population level has a significant but rather 
negligible impact on the employment level. These somewhat bewildering results suggest 
that the time series is suffering from one or several structural breaks which as a result 
called for the estimation of the following sub-samples. The results are however not 
completely unanticipated as the time series covers data from the 1990’s during the 
Swedish crises, which expectedly results in difficulties in measuring labour market 
outcomes.  
The first sub-sample is presented in column b and column d and accounts for the years 
2000-2013. Here, the labour taxation rate is found to have a slightly negative impact, 
though still insignificant. However the adjusted R2 has risen marginally from the former 
0.4791 to 0.5663 and 0.5459 respectively.  
The last sub-sample consists of the years 2005-2013 and is presented in column c and 
column e. In these estimations the labour taxation rate is found to have a negative impact 
on the employment level with a 0.01 significance level. A one unit increase in the labour 
taxation rate is therefore associated with a decrease in the employment level with a 4.34 
and 3.22 percent correspondingly. 
In regards to the control variables, these are found to be highly significant but with an 
incredibly small effect. The inclusion of the variable of municipality costs raises the 
adjusted R2 from 0.6624 (column c) to 0.7350 (column e).  
Nonetheless, the OLS estimations are still probably suffering from bias and are thus 
inconsistent owing to endogeneity and can therefore not be assumed to represent the 
actual relationships and effects. However the OLS estimations are still of large interest 
and provide useful comparisons to the upcoming instrumental variables approach.  
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6.2 FIRST STAGE RESULTS   
The results from the first stage estimation, equation (2) is presented in Table 2 
below.  The assumed endogenous variable, Taxes, is here regressed upon the 
instrumental variable, AVG_Taxes.  
 
TABLE 2. FIRST STAGE RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be deducted from Table 2, there is a significant and positive relationship between 
the average neighboring labour taxation rate and the municipalities own labour taxation 
rate. To qualify for the use of the IV estimator, one important requirement must be 
fulfilled, that is, a strong first stage. Therefore the two tax rates must have a strong 
correlation or else the estimations may suffer from severe bias among other things 
(Wooldridge, 2009).  
To determine whether or not the instrument is strong enough, (Staiger & Stock, 1997) 
require the F-statistic of the first stage to be above ten. Otherwise, the risk of using a 
weak instrument is far too great. The result demonstrates that the obtained F-statistic in 
the first stage has a value of 31.52 which clearly exceeds the milestone of ten. This value 
suggests that the use of the chosen instrumental variable, AVG_Taxes, is satisfactory and 
can thus be viewed as being a strong instrument. 
 
  
Dependent 
variable: taxes 
 
 
AVG_Taxes 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
F-Statistic 
0.9532*** 
(0.0105) 
 
5640 
 
31.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient is followed by standard errors in brackets. *** indicates 
the significance level 0.01. 
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6.3 SECOND STAGE RESULTS   
In TABLE 3 below, the results for the estimations of the second stage Equation 3 can be 
viewed. Parallel to the OLS model, sub-sample regressions have been made in addition to 
the complete time series. Columns (d) and (e) represent the equation including the 
additional control variable of municipality costs.  
 
TABLE 3. SECOND STAGE RESULTS 
 
 
 
Similar to the obtained OLS results, columns (a), (b) and column (d) illustrate a slightly 
positive as well as slightly negative significant effect of the labour taxation rate on the 
employment level. This result strengthens the suspicion of the time-series suffering from 
a structural break. The sub-sample in column (c) does now have a taxation coefficient 
 1994-2013 
 
(a) 
2000-2013 
 
(b) 
2005-2013 
 
(c) 
2000-2013 
With expenses 
(d) 
2005-2013 
With expenses 
(e) 
Taxes 0.0032059** 
(0.0013127) 
-0.0171546*** 
(0.0049312) 
-0.0911012*** 
(0.0087734) 
-0.0005503 
(0.0077905) 
-0.0786773*** 
(0.0092797) 
Young 1.67e-06 
(2.11e-06) 
0.0000148*** 
(2.74e-06) 
0.0000356*** 
(5.47e-06) 
0.0000117*** 
(2.79e-06) 
0.0000249*** 
(5.36e-06) 
Old 0.0000243*** 
(1.05e-06) 
0.0000179*** 
(1.26e-06) 
9.73e-06*** 
(2.01e-06) 
0.0000214*** 
(1.52e-06) 
0.0000199*** 
(2.50e-06) 
Work-age 5.61e-06*** 
(7.43e-07) 
-3.38e-06*** 
(1.09e-06) 
-0.0000128*** 
(2.38e-06) 
-2.28e-06** 
(1.11e-06) 
-0.0000106*** 
(2.30e-06) 
Municipality 
costs 
------- ------- ------ -4.91e-07*** 
(1.34e-07) 
-1.16e-06*** 
(1.61e-07) 
Adjusted R2 0.4795 0.5711 0.5237 0.5452 0.6269 
Coefficients are followed by standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
The estimates have time and individual fixed effects. 
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almost twice the size of the corresponding OLS coefficient. When adding the additional 
control variable of municipality costs, the taxation coefficient reduces slightly from -0.091 
to -0.079. The adjusted R2 on the other hand rises from 0.5237 to 0.6269. The preferred 
instrumental variable specification therefore seems to be the shorter time-series in 
column (e) resembling the preferred OLS specification. A mutual difference for all sub-
samples and regressions is that the OLS model underestimates the correlation between 
the labour taxation rate and the employment level.  
Although the taxation coefficient in specification (d) remain insignificant in the IVmodel, 
the first two specifications in column (a) and column (b) become significant at the 5 and 
1 per cent significance levels compared to the previous insignificant results.  
The control variables are found to have very negligible effects on the employment level 
and are significant at the 1 and 5 per cent significance levels expect for the variable 
“young” in specification (a).  
 
6.4 ROBUSTNESS 
6. 4. 1 Unit root  
When using panel data models it is important to perform unit root tests to check for the 
presence of unit roots. If there is such a presence, the data suffers from non-stationarity 
and can cause difficulties in statistical inference. When performing the unit root tests on 
this data-set, the test by Harris-Tzavalis is considered the most appropriate as it assumes 
that the number of panels tend to infinity whereas the number of time periods is fixed 
(STATA n.d). Consequently , this test is suitable for a data-set with a large amount of 
panels. In addition to the Harris-Tzavalis unit root test, two more tests have been made 
to explore the results further and also to be used in the case of uncertainty, namely the 
Levin, Lin & Chu test and the Fisher ADF test.  
The result from the unit root tests can be seen in Table 4 below.  
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TABLE 4. UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
 
The Harris-Tzavalis tests suggest that the variables “Old”, “Young” and “Work-age” suffer 
from a unit root and thus are non-stationary. However, the other two tests suggest that 
these variables are indeed stationary. The Fisher-ADF test displays that the variable 
“Taxes” has a unit root while the Harris-Tzavalis and the Levin, Lin & Chu tests suggest 
otherwise.  
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Method 
 
Statistics 
 
 
Probability 
 
Observations 
 
Stationary 
 
Employment 
level 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
Harris-Tzavalis 
Fisher-ADF 
-50.5993 
-5.4128 
-11.2133 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
2538 
2538 
2538 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
AVG_Taxes 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
Harris-Tzavalis 
Fisher-ADF 
-1.6738 
-1.7117 
-2.0184 
0.0471 
0.0435 
0.0218 
2538 
2538 
2538 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Taxes 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
Harris-Tzavalis 
Fisher-ADF 
-21.7117  
-3.3270 
1.3697 
0.0000 
0.0004 
0.9146 
2538 
2538 
2538  
Yes 
Yes 
No 
 
Old 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
Harris-Tzavalis 
Fisher-ADF 
-44.7280 
12.2589 
-8.3235 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
2538 
2538 
2538  
Yes 
No 
Yes 
 
Young 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
Harris-Tzavalis 
Fisher-ADF 
-35.5626 
0.4359 
-5.7269 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.0000 
2538 
2538 
2538 
 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
 
 
Work-age 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
Harris-Tzavalis 
Fisher-ADF 
-28.9133 
7.7410 
-2.0374 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.0208 
2538 
2538 
2538 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
 
Municipality 
expenses 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
Harris-Tzavalis 
Fisher-ADF 
-46.4580 
-6.5250 
-7.3712 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
2538 
2538 
2538 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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6. 4. 2 Hausman test 
To ensure that the fixed effects model is the appropriate model for this study, a Hausman 
test was performed. The Hausman test has a null hypothesis that the preferred model has 
random effects and that the alternative hypothesis has fixed effects. When performing 
this specification test on my data set, a P-value of 0.0000 was obtained, clearly rejecting 
the null hypothesis of using a random effects model. As a result, the choice of using a 
fixed effects model is validated by the Hausman specification test.  
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7. DISCUSSION 
7.1 General Discussion 
The main theory of income taxation having a negative impact on employment was 
confirmed in this study, both in the regular OLS model as well as in the Instrumental 
Variable model.  
When using the complete time series the results were surprisingly unexpected. In the 
OLS model, the income taxation rate did not have a significant effect on the employment 
level and was even slightly positive. The IV model showed significance at the 5 per cent 
level; however the results were yet again slightly positive. Clearly, these results were quite 
unanticipated.  
When dividing the sample into smaller time periods the effect started moving in a more 
intuitional direction. This undoubtedly raised the suspicion of the complete time series 
suffering from a structural break. Owing to the STATA edition used, no formal structural 
break test was available to perform. Nonetheless, there are still reasons to believe that a 
break actually does exist.  
One of the reasons is attributable to the financial crisis followed by the housing bubble 
that Sweden experienced in the early 1990s (Englund, 1999). During this period the 
unemployment level relatively sky-rocketed in addition to several other financial variables 
moving in extreme directions (Statistics Sweden, 2005). In a financial situation resembling 
this state, the employment level is not as susceptible to alterations in the income taxation 
rate. Nonetheless, as the economy slowly recovered the relationship between income 
taxation and employment became easier to measure.  
This paper chose to use an Instrumental Variables model to estimate the effect that the 
income taxation rate has on employment and hence dispose of the endogeneity issues. A 
key part for the Instrumental Variable model to be unbiased and effective is by the use of 
a strong instrument. With an F-statistic of 31.52 the chosen instrument met this 
expectation and was therefore seen as a valid instrument to further the analysis with.  
The results from the second stage suggest that the impact of income taxation on 
employment has been massively underestimated compared to the regular OLS model.  
For the preferred specification in column (e) in both Table 1 and Table 3, the effect 
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increases from -0.0321641*** to -0.0786773***, which is more than twice the size. This 
increase is aligned with the hypothesis of the OLS model suffering from downward bias 
due to reverse causality. As policy makers have been targeting high unemployment levels 
by altering the income taxation rate, regular OLS models are not able to capture the full 
impact that income taxation has on the employment. These results suggest that measures 
taken by policymakers actually have a much stronger effect than previously thought.  
The use of the Instrumental Variable approach in this framework has displayed that there 
in fact is potential endogeneity within taxation variables that has to be considered when 
performing this type of analysis. In the case of Sweden there is a clear reason to believe 
that the taxation schedule is endogenous after having implemented several income 
taxation policies with the goal of reducing unemployment.  
The IV model seems to be reasonably fitting for the Swedish municipalities but there is 
no reason to believe that this method is not suitable for other countries as well. 
Nevertheless the issue with reverse causality might not be completely absent by the use of 
the instrument in this study. If there for instance exists a correlation between changes in 
employment levels across municipalities then the issue still remains.  
The results of this study are in accordance with the few previous studies made in a similar 
manner. (Lehmann et al, 2013) also find that the OLS results tend to underestimate the 
relationship of the effects that labour taxation have on the employment and 
unemployment.  
 
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS  
As the results of this study suggest, the estimated effect of the income taxation rate on 
the employment level has been underestimated when not including measures against the 
endogeneity problems. The results from the Instrumental Variable model demonstrate 
that the effect is almost twice the size of the regular OLS results.  
These results are of great significance to policymakers as it is essential for them to 
understand the entire impact that the policy alteration makes. A change in the income 
taxation rate can now be interpreted and assumed to have a greater effect on the 
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employment level than previously assumed. This can further be interpreted in two main 
directions depending on which political belonging one belongs to. Either one infers these 
results as a confirmation that the remedy towards unemployment is to lower the income 
taxation rate.  
However, probably most important of all is to not forget about the complete picture 
within policy-making. As we all know, one cannot simply rely on policy-actions only 
using one instrument to reach one goal. There are several policies working in different 
directions and targeting different groups at once.  
There are also other factors affecting the labour supply of individuals that are not 
affected by taxes, some of which are individuals’ differences in skills, motivation and 
health (Rosen, 1979).  
For that reason, my hopes with this study is to solely build within the already existing 
field of research and to further understand the complete impact that the income taxation 
rate has on the employment level in Sweden.  
 
7.3 TIME-LINE CONSIDERATIONS  
This paper used a time series of 21 years of annual data which can be considered enough 
to make this type of analysis; though an increase in the time-series might also result in 
more robust results. However, as there were suspicions of structural breaks within the 
entire time series, the reduced time period was almost certainly able to tell more of the 
story.   
 
7.4 SAMPLE SIZE AND VARIABLES  
The sample size was relatively large with a panel of 283 municipalities over the time range 
of 21 years. The variables that were controlled for were the amount of old, young, work-
age people and the municipality expenses. It would have been preferred to control for the 
political standing of the municipalities. However, due to the lack in data within the 
chosen time frame this variable was excluded in addition to other reasons.  
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8. CONCLUSION 
This study argues that labour taxation has an employment-reducing effect. To investigate 
to which extent the size of this effect is, the potential endogeneity of the taxation 
variables has been taken into account.  
The effect of income taxation on the employment level was empirically tested using a 
panel data of 283 Swedish municipalities over the time period of 1993-2013. This study 
proposes that the consideration of reverse causality within the taxation framework is of 
upmost importance and the significance of managing these issues within future research 
to obtain unbiased results.  
This paper chose to cope with the endogeneity issues by the means of an Instrumental 
Variable model. The theoretical assumption of municipalities competing for workers 
using the income taxation rate worked as a base for the choice of instrument, where an 
average tax rate was computed for all the neighbouring municipalities for each 
municipality.  The results suggest that the income taxation rate has a negative significant 
impact on the employment level. When accounting for the endogeneity in the 
Instrumental Variable model, the results suggest that the negative impact grows to almost 
twice the size compared to the regular OLS results, suggesting an immense 
underestimated effect. These results are in accordance with the theoretical framework as 
well as the small amount of previous studies within this area. 
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9. FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.1 SUGGESTED IMPROVE MENTS FOR SIMILAR ST UDIES 
This study proceeded from the theory of the endogeneity of taxation, and acts as an 
attempt to plot the Swedish labour market and its integration to the financial market. 
However, the inclusion of other financial variables apart from the income taxation rate 
has not been considered furthermore in the model. This is of course an issue, as there are 
additional variables that might be thought of as appropriate to include. One of which is 
the political standing of the municipalities. Given that the municipalities are independent 
and self-ruling with different politics, one might expect that whether the municipality is 
right- or leftwing, there is an effect on the tax schedule which in turn affects employment. 
Further studies within this area could put added emphasis on this aspect and include 
some measurement corresponding to the political standing of the municipalities. It is 
commonly supposed that right-wing politics are in support of lowering taxes in order to 
stimulate employment.  
Relating to the theory of the labour supply of women and young people being more 
elastic than the average labour supply, a further analysis and sub-sampling of these two 
groups would be highly interesting to study. This would enable an additional analysis of 
which groups that are more sensitive to tax reforms. These results can thereafter be used 
as tools for policymakers who might make these sub-groups targets for future policy 
actions.  
 
9.2 OTHER AREAS OF ST UDY 
In the midst of the topic of taxes and the relationship to employment, one might be 
interested in developing this research area by focusing solely on the effects that tax 
progressivity have on employment.   
This study attempted to build on the existing research concerning the endogeneity of 
taxation and dealt with the endogeneity problems with the use of an instrumental 
variables approach. In this case, the neighboring municipalities’ tax schedules acted as 
instruments. Continuing this path would be interesting of several reasons. Firstly, as it still 
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is a widely un-researched area there are spread opinions regarding the endogeneity at all. 
In this case it would benefit the existing research with more studies to enable stronger 
conclusions.  
Second, if the endogeneity issues are established within this framework, studies can focus 
on discovering and launching better instruments. Or on the other hand, future studies 
can put effort into determining additional ways of dealing with the endogeneity of 
taxation.  
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